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1. Introduction 
 
In the opening pages of Reasons and Persons, Parfit lays out the basic 
normative and evaluative concepts that he will take for granted and in 
terms of which he will formulate many of his doctrines and arguments.  
These are the concepts of having a reason to do some act, of an act’s being 
what one ought to do, of an act’s being morally wrong, of an outcome’s 
being good or bad, and, finally, “of what is in someone’s self-interest, or 
what would be best for this person” (ix-x).1  Parfit calls special attention to 
this last concept, thinking it necessary to say more about it.  He does so in 
an appendix, “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best,” a ten-page mini-
essay that has taken on a life of its own quite apart from the body to which 
it is appended (493-502). 
 
 In that appendix – Appendix I – Parfit, among other things, introduces 
a tripartite taxonomy of theories of well-being that has since become the 
orthodox taxonomy in the field (493-494); argues that hedonist theories 
should take a certain distinctive form (493-494); identifies a problem for 
desire-fulfillment theories that still has no received solution (494); gives 
arguments for the theses that desire-fulfillment theorists should accept the 
possibility of posthumous benefit and harm (495) and that they should 
count only our global desires as being relevant to how well our lives go 
(496-99); and discusses, perhaps for the first time in the contemporary 
literature, the advantages of a so-called hybrid theory of well-being (501-
502). 
 
 Appendix I appears to be the most influential and important of the 
appendices to Reasons and Persons (it also happens to be the longest).2  The 
present essay serves as a critical guide to it.  I will explain, elaborate, and 
evaluate most of its main theses and arguments.  For those interested in 
studying an issue further, I will provide references to some relevant 
                                               
1 Bare page references are to the “Reprinted with further corrections 1987” edition of 
Reasons and Persons. 
2 It has been reprinted as a standalone essay (e.g., in Shafer-Landau 2012) and has its own 
Google Scholar entry. 
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literature.  I hope to convey to readers the interest, importance, and 
richness of “What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best.” 
 
 Appendix I also deserves the label ‘seminal’.  When Reasons and 
Persons appeared, the topic of what makes someone’s life go best, which is 
now usually referred to in contemporary ethics as the topic of well-being, 
was written on and studied by anglophone philosophers as a self-standing 
area of inquiry far less than it is today, when there are entire journals 
devoted to the topic.3  Parfit deserves some of the credit for the present 
robustness of this subfield of moral philosophy.  
 
 Theories of well-being, or of self-interest, answer the question of 
“What would be best for someone, or would be most in this person’s 
interests, or would make this person’s life go, for him, as well as possible” 
(493).  This question, the philosophical question of well-being, can be 
clarified in several ways.  In asking it, we are asking about a distinctive 
kind of evaluation, different from moral assessments, as when we wonder 
what kind of life is the morally best kind of life for someone to lead; and 
different from, for example, assessments of how meaningful some person’s 
life is.  We are instead asking about self-interest, about benefit and harm, 
about personal welfare.  It is a matter of continued controversy, however, 
just what we are asking when we ask the philosophical question of well-
being.  Though the appearance of Appendix I is motivated by the wish to 
shed light on the topic of self-interest, Parfit does not address this issue 
head-on.  Like most philosophers of well-being, he relies on the particular 
ways he puts the issue in ordinary language.  We can also use as a guide 
the claims about self-interest that Parfit finds intuitive, which help to 
reveal just what concept he is using.4 
 
 When Parfit wonders what makes someone’s life go best, the making 
relation that he is talking about here is not a causal relation.  The purely 
philosophical question of well-being is not the partly empirical question of 
what causes people to be better or worse off.  House fires generally cause 
people to be worse off; access to clean water generally causes people to be 
better off.  They do this by causing other, distinct events that “make” – in 
a more direct way – people better or worse off.  This more direct kind of 
making is what happens when the event in question is intrinsically good or 
bad for a person, or good or bad in itself.  Access to clean water and house 
fires are of mere instrumental value and disvalue for people.  So what 
                                               
3 Such as the International Journal of Wellbeing. 
4 For overviews of the controversies surrounding the issue of just what the philosophical 
question of well-being is, see Campbell 2016 and Lin forthcoming b. 
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things are intrinsically good or bad for people?  That is precisely Parfit’s 
question.5 
 
 Appendix I is divided into five unlabeled sections, the divisions being 
indicated simply with skipped lines.  The first section (493-495) begins by 
introducing Parfit’s now orthodox taxonomy of theories of well-being, on 
which there are three main kinds of theory: Hedonistic, Desire-
Fulfillment, and Objective List.6  The section goes on primarily (i) to argue 
that hedonism should take a certain form, (ii) to explore the Desire-
Fulfillment Theory, (iii) to argue that a certain breed of it – the Success 
Theory – is superior to an unadorned version of it, and (iv) to compare the 
Success Theory to a certain distinctive form of Hedonism, Preference-
Hedonism. 
 
 The second and third sections address questions that arise for 
Preference-Hedonism and the Success Theory – and in fact for any kind of 
Desire-Fulfillment Theory.  Should the preferences or desires that a person 
actually has be used to determine how well things go for them in 
counterfactual scenarios?  The brief second section (495-496) argues ‘No’.  
The third section (496-499) considers in some depth whether these theories 
should take a Summative or Global form, arguing in favor of the latter. 
 
 Section four (499-501) introduces the Objective List Theory and 
compares it with the Success Theory and, to a lesser extent, Preference-
Hedonism.  Parfit is here essentially exploring the debate, familiar to 
philosophers of well-being and among the most central debates in the 
field, over whether well-being is objective or subjective. 
 
                                               
5 Just how we should understand and describe the evaluative notion that is the proper 
object of investigation in the philosophy of well-being (and axiology more generally), 
including even what vocabulary to use to characterize it, is a matter of continuing 
controversy in value theory.  I here use ‘intrinsic value’ neutrally, as a placeholder for 
whatever notion is the proper object of study in axiology (cf. Hurka 2014: 69).  For a 
recent overview of the relevant controversies, see Rønnow-Rasmussen 2015. 
6 So long as each category is understood broadly, so that, for example, a Happiness 
Theory counts as Hedonistic, an Aim-Achievement Theory counts as a version of the 
Desire-Fulfillment Theory, and a Perfectionist Theory counts as a version of the Objective 
List Theory, this taxonomy seems close to exhaustive.  It may exclude Value-Realization 
Theories, on which what would be best for someone is what would best realize their 
values; proponents of these views are often at pains to emphasize that one’s values are 
not merely one’s desires.  For Happiness Theories, see Sumner 1996, ch. 6 (Sumner would 
not classify his own view as Hedonistic) and Feldman 2010, Pt. II (Feldman would 
classify his Happiness Theory as Hedonistic).  For a theory that includes aim 
achievement, see Scanlon 1998.  For a Perfectionist Theory, see Kraut 2009.  For Value-
Realization Theories, see Raibley 2010 and Dorsey 2012.  Finally, for recent defenses of a 
Hedonistic Theory, see Crisp 2006; a Desire-Fulfillment Theory, see Heathwood 2005; 
and an Objective List Theory, see Rice 2013. 
 
4 
 The fifth and final section (501-502) introduces a new category of 
theory of well-being, one that combines subjective and objective elements.  
This “composite” account is nowadays standardly referred to as the 
Hybrid Theory of well-being.  Although Parfit refrains from committing to 
any particular theory of well-being, one suspects that he finds the Hybrid 
Theory most attractive. 
 
 Let’s now examine some of these issues more deeply.  Since there is 
not space to give a thorough treatment of all of them, I will focus on what 
I take to be the most interesting issues and the topics that are less well 
trodden in the well-being literature. 
 
2. Preference-Hedonism and the Theory of Pleasure and Pain 
 
The first argument Parfit makes in the Appendix is an argument against a 
theory of well-being he calls Narrow Hedonism.  Parfit objects not to this 
theory’s central evaluative claim – that what is most in a person’s interest 
is for their balance of pleasure over pain to be maximized, a claim made 
by any hedonist7 – but to its central metaphysical claim: its account of the 
nature of pleasure and pain.  As Parfit unhelpfully formulates it, this is the 
view “that pleasure and pain are two distinctive kinds of experience” 
(493).  Parfit appears to be talking about a theory of the nature of pleasure 
and pain that is sometimes called the Distinctive Feeling Theory.  It was 
assumed by G.E. Moore (1903: §12) and has been defended recently by 
Ben Bramble (2013).  According to it, pleasure and pain are single, 
uniform feelings or sensations, in the same category as the taste of 
cilantro, the feeling of nausea, or the smell of lilac.  Parfit’s brief argument 
against this view, due initially to Sidgwick (1907: 127) and usually 
referred to now as the heterogeneity problem, is an argument from 
introspection: attending to one’s own phenomenology reveals that there 
simply is no single, distinctive feeling common in cases of, for example, 
 
satisfying an intense thirst or lust, listening to music, solving an 
intellectual problem, reading a tragedy, and knowing that one’s child is 
happy.  (493)8 
 
 Parfit believes that a more plausible theory of pleasure and pain 
appeals not to sensory feelings but attitudes, in particular desire: 
                                               
7 The “adjusted” hedonistic theories put forward in Feldman 2004 violate this claim, but 
it is controversial whether these theories are genuine forms of hedonism. 
8 Many philosophers endorse the heterogeneity objection (for references, see Heathwood 
2007: 26, note 8).  For recent replies to the heterogeneity objection, see Bramble (2013: 209-
11) and Lin (forthcoming a).  The Distinctive Feeling Theory should be distinguished 
from a similar view, the Hedonic Tone Theory (Broad 1930: 229–231, Kagan 1992: 172), 
which Parfit would also reject. 
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On the use of ‘pain’ which has rational and moral significance, all pains 
are when experienced unwanted, and a pain is worse or greater the more 
it is unwanted.  (494) 
 
Parfit is here advancing the view that what makes an experience a pain, or a 
painful experience, is nothing about its intrinsic nature but about the 
stance the subject takes towards the experience (and similarly for 
pleasure).  This view avoids the implication that the “various experiences 
[listed above] contain any distinctive common quality” (494).9 
 
 But aren’t some experiences inherently painful?  Consider what it is like 
to step barefoot on a tack.  Doesn’t it seem to be part of the intrinsic nature 
of that experience that it hurts, or is painful?  Parfit’s theory of the nature 
of pleasure and pain must deny this.  But some remarks later in the 
appendix, made for a different purpose, address this concern.  There Parfit 
notes that 
 
After taking certain kinds of drug, people claim that the quality of their 
sensations has not altered, but they no longer dislike these sensations. 
We would regard such drugs as effective analgesics.  (501) 
 
“This,” he says, 
 
suggests that the badness of a pain consists in its being disliked, and that 
it is not disliked because it is bad.  (501) 
 
If it suggests this, then, since a sensation’s being painful seems sufficient 
for its being bad, it also suggests that the painfulness of a sensation consists 
in its being disliked – or unwanted while it is happening.10  Thus, if it 
appears to subjects that the painfulness of the sensation of stepping 
barefoot on a tack is intrinsic to this sensation, then this appearance may 
be an illusion.  Perhaps it results from a kind of mental projection of one’s 
intense dislike of the sensation onto a sensation that is, considered in 
itself, hedonically neutral. 
 
 Parfit uses his desire-based theory of pleasure and pain to introduce a 
version of hedonism that he sees as preferable to Narrow Hedonism; this 
is Preference-Hedonism.  Preference-Hedonists agree that pleasurable 
                                               
9 The view also helps Parfit later on in the Appendix.  He relies on it without comment in 
arguing against a certain proposal for saving Summative Desire-Fulfillment Theories 
from his drug-addiction objection (see pp. 497-498).  I explain Summative Theories and 
that objection in section 5 below. 
10 Parfit does not here fuss over any possible differences between disliked sensations and 
unwanted-when-experienced sensations, but he does fuss over this in later work (Parfit 
2011: ch. 2, §6).  There he prefers a liking-based theory over a desire-based theory. 
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experiences, and these alone, are intrinsically good for us and painful 
experiences, and these alone, are intrinsically bad.  But it replaces the 
Distinctive Feeling Theory of pleasure and pain with Parfit’s preferred 
desire-based account.  Narrow Hedonists presumably have to say that the 
sensations that are experienced under the influence of the drug Parfit 
describes above – sensations that their subjects don’t at all mind or care to 
avoid – are nonetheless painful and bad, and make their lives worse.  
Preference-Hedonism, by contrast, avoids this counterintuitive 
implication. 
 
3. The Unrestricted Desire-Fulfillment Theory and the Problem of 
Remote Desires 
 
One of the most important arguments put forth in Appendix I takes only a 
few lines to present.  It concerns the Desire-Fulfillment Theory, according 
to which “what would be best for someone is what, throughout his life, 
would best fulfil his desires” (493).  The most straightforward Desire-
Fulfillment Theory holds that all desires count – that the satisfaction of 
any desire is good in itself for a person and makes their life go better.  This 
Parfit calls the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfillment Theory.  Parfit finds this 
theory unacceptable on the basis of the case of “the stranger on the train.” 
 
 Actually, no train is mentioned in the version of the case that appears 
in Appendix I.  But Parfit is here reprising a case introduced earlier in 
Reasons and Persons, in Part Two.  He used it first to give an example of a 
desire that is not conditional on its own persistence (151), and next to 
illustrate how changes in one’s concerns do not require changes in what 
one believes worthy of concern (157).  The original case begins, “Suppose 
that I meet some stranger on a train . . .” (151).11  In the version in our 
appendix, the stranger 
 
has what is believed to be a fatal disease. My sympathy is aroused, and I 
strongly want this stranger to be cured. Later, unknown to me, this 
stranger is cured. On the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfilment Theory, this 
event is good for me, and makes my life go better. This is not plausible. 
We should reject this theory.  (494) 
 
This simple counterexample illustrates a feature of desire-fulfillment 
theories not yet emphasized: that desire fulfillment requires no feelings of 
fulfillment.  All that is required is that the object of the desire obtains. 
 
                                               
11 Parfit actually applies the case to issues of well-being before we reach Appendix I, in 
Appendix C (468). 
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 In a book whose manuscript Parfit had seen while writing Reasons and 
Persons,12 James Griffin put more abstractly what may be the same 
concern: 
 
The breadth of the [desire] account, which is its attraction, is also its 
great flaw.  . . .  It allows my utility to be determined . . .  by things that 
do not affect my life in any way at all.  The trouble is that one’s desires 
spread themselves so widely over the world that their objects extend far 
outside the bound of what, with any plausibility, one could take as 
touching one’s own well-being.  (Griffin 1986: 16-17) 
 
This, which I call “the problem of remote desires,” has been explored in 
some depth since Reasons and Persons,13 but has, as yet, no received 
solution. 
 
 Parfit’s own solution restricts the theory to count only desires that are 
about one’s own life.  Somewhat cryptically, Parfit calls the theory so-
restricted the Success Theory.  Since the desire that the stranger be cured is 
not a desire about Parfit’s own life, the Success Theory delivers the 
desired result that the stranger’s being cured is no benefit to Parfit.  
Incidentally, Preference-Hedonism delivers this result, too, since the 
stranger’s being cured has no effect on Parfit’s experiences. 
 
 Parfit admits that when the Success Theory “appeals only to desires 
that are about our own lives, it may be unclear what this excludes” (494).  
But some discussion, including several examples, help shed some light on 
how Parfit understands what it is for a desire to be about one’s own life 
(494-95).  Interestingly, Parfit maintains that desires whose fulfillment or 
frustration turns on what happens after one is dead can nonetheless count 
as desires about one’s own life.  This contrasts Parfit’s Success Theory 
with a similar theory proposed in 1980 by Mark Carl Overvold.  Like 
Parfit, Overvold offers a restricted version of the Desire-Fulfillment 
Theory, though in response to a different but related problem: the 
problem of self-sacrifice.14  Overvold’s view counts only desires with this 
feature: they are for states of affairs that can obtain at some time only if 
the subject of the desire exists at that time (Overvold 1980: 10n).  Though 
Overvold didn’t craft the theory with this in mind, it delivers the desired 
result about the stranger on the train.  And it does so without 
countenancing posthumous benefit and harm – as Overvold desired 
(Overvold 1980: 108). 
                                               
12 See footnote 25 on p. 532 in the first edition of Reasons and Persons.  Griffin’s then-
forthcoming book was at that point entitled Welfare rather than Well-Being. 
13 See, for example, Scanlon 1998 (113-123), Lukas 2010, Fletcher 2016 (§§ 2.3, 2.6), and 
Heathwood 2016 (141-42). 
14 On the problem of self-sacrifice, see Overvold 1980, Rosati 2009, and Heathwood 2011. 
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 Whether we understand the restriction in the Parfitian or the 
Overvoldian way, the resulting theory seems to suffer from convincing 
counterexamples.  Consider, for instance, the desire that the team one 
roots for win.  For many people, this desire is as strong as, and as 
important a part of their identity, as many desires that are about their own 
lives.  When your team wins and this desire is fulfilled, this seems like a 
good thing in your life.  But the Success Theory implies otherwise.  Note 
that no Hedonistic Theory would exclude the pleasure taken in the victory 
of one’s team; nor, it seems, should the Desire-Fulfillment Theory be 
restricted to exclude the corresponding desire fulfillments.15 
 
4. Actual Preferences and Counterfactual Well-Being 
 
In the brief second section of the appendix, Parfit raises an interesting and 
not-often-discussed question: “Should we appeal only to the desires and 
preferences that someone actually has?” (495).  If we endorse some kind of 
desire-based theory of well-being, such as the Unrestricted Desire-
Fulfillment Theory, the Success Theory, or Preference-Hedonism, and we 
are trying to decide how well off some actual person would be in an 
imagined counterfactual scenario, should we look to the desires the 
person actually has, or to the desires that they have in the counterfactual 
scenario? 
 
 A common way of thinking seems committed to holding that only 
one’s actual preferences matter, but Parfit shows the mistake in this.  
Suppose you decide to stay home and read King Lear rather than go to a 
party; and suppose that, throughout your evening, you continue to be 
glad that, or to prefer that, you stayed home to read King Lear rather than 
go to the party (495-6).  It is tempting to infer from this that you made the 
right choice – that staying home to read King Lear gave you the better 
evening.  But this inference is fallacious, for it could still be that if you had 
gone to the party, you would have, throughout your evening, been glad 
that you went to the party rather than stayed home to read King Lear.  The 
common way of thinking would then imply not only that staying home to 
read King Lear gave you the better evening but also the contradictory 
thought that going to the party would have given you a better evening. 
 
 Parfit thus claims that we should “appeal not only to my actual 
preferences, in the alternative I choose, but also to the preferences that I 
would have had if I had chosen otherwise” (496).  In doing so, he makes it 
sound as if his answer to the question that animates this section is “both.”  
But that appearance is misleading.  For he is there saying that only in 
                                               
15 I discuss this sort of counterexample in Heathwood 2016: 141. 
 
9 
making a comparative judgment between the actual course of events and 
some counterfactual course of events should the theory take into account 
both actual and counterfactual preferences.  That is consistent with (and 
indeed explained by) the idea that to know how absolutely good one of 
these scenarios would be for the person, we look only at the preferences 
the person has within that scenario. 
 
 Though for a different purpose, Eden Lin (2019) helpfully 
distinguishes the two main options here for desire-based and other 
subjectivist theories: Same World Subjectivism (the approach Parfit favors), 
on which scenarios are evaluated according to the desires (or other 
favoring attitudes) that one has in that scenario, and Actual World 
Subjectivism, which evaluates all counterfactual scenarios using one’s 
actual desires.16 
 
 The considerations Parfit discusses – concerning the choice to stay 
home and read King Lear or go out to a party – do indeed tell in favor of a 
Same-World rather than an Actual-World approach.  But there are 
considerations that Parfit does not discuss that might attract one to an 
Actual-World approach.  Consider   
 
The Brand-New Life.  An eccentric billionaire with an interesting 
drug offers you a Brand-New Life.  You will be relocated to a new 
city – one that does not now appeal to you at all.  You will be 
immersed in a new circle of friends – people with whom you now 
have no wish to associate.  You will be given a new career – one 
you now have absolutely no interest in.  You will never be allowed 
to return to your current home, to see your current friends or 
family again, or to pursue your current career and other projects.  
But you will be given a drug – a complacency pill17 – that will 
gradually cause you to want to be in your new city once you are 
there, to want to be associating with your new friends, and to want 
to be engaged in your new career.  The drug will also cause your 
longings for your old life to diminish and eventually cease 
altogether.  As it happens, the life you will lead if you decline the 
offer – your old life – has its ups and downs, and, although it is a 
fine life by any reasonable standard, has its share of unfulfilled 
desire.  But owing to the effectiveness of the complacency pill, the 
                                               
16 I defend a Same-World Subjectivist theory in Heathwood 2005, though, to distinguish 
it from idealized desire theories, I describe it as an “actualist” theory.  A somewhat 
different Same-World approach – Global rather than Summative – is defended in Bykvist 
(2006). 
17 As in Bricker (1980, pp. 398-400). 
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Brand-New Life on offer will fulfill far more of the desires you will 
come to have if you lead that life.18 
 
Would it be in your best interest to accept the offer?  Would you be foolish 
to decline this Brand-New Life? 
 
I suspect that very few of us who think our lives at least minimally 
decent and feel at all attached to our friends, family, projects, and careers 
would even contemplate such an offer – even though we recognize that 
we would be turning down a life that would deliver far more of what we 
would want if we were to choose that life. 
 
Though I wouldn’t contemplate doing this either, I believe that the 
Same-World approach, which Parfit endorses, has the correct implication 
here: that I would benefit more, or would get a life that is more in my 
interest to get, if I were to choose the Brand-New Life.  The Actual-World 
approach can give us the alternative answer that you will be better off 
remaining in your current life.  That is because the Brand-New Life rates 
poorly when judged by the standards of your actual desires. 
 
But the Actual-World approach is problematic, and not only for what it 
implies about the decision whether to stay home and read King Lear or go 
to the party.  Suppose that I currently have no desire to try a certain sort of 
unfamiliar cuisine; I prefer to stick with my usual type of food, though it 
barely excites me.  Suppose it’s also true that if I were to try the unfamiliar 
cuisine, I would love it, devour it with gusto, and be very glad that I 
decided to try it.  In other words, I would enjoy more desire fulfillment – 
because my newly acquired desires would be much more intense than my 
desires for my usual meal – than I would get by eating my usual meal.  
The Actual-World approach nevertheless implies, implausibly, that opting 
for my usual meal would be better for me. 
 
The Actual-World approach also has the following bizarre – perhaps 
even incoherent – implication about the Brand-New Life: that if you don’t 
in fact choose the Brand-New Life, we can say, correctly, that it would 
have been a worse life for you, but that if you do choose it, then we must 
say that it is better than the life you would have gotten (your old life) had 
you not chosen it.  That is because, on the Same-World approach, if you 
do not choose the Brand-New Life, we judge it by the standards of your 
actual desires, but if you do choose the Brand-New Life, it becomes your 
actual life, and so we judge it by the standards of the desires that you have 
                                               
18 The drug changes you gradually rather than abruptly to ensure that you will survive 
the changes, in case a psychological theory of personal identity is true (see Andrea 
Sauchelli’s chapter in this volume). 
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in the Brand-New Life.  This is similar to Parfit’s objection, concerning 
King Lear and the party, that “This theory thus implies that each 
alternative would have been better than the other” (496). 
 
I therefore agree with the Parfitian Same-World approach that I would 
be better off in the Brand-New Life, no matter what I end up choosing.  I 
did say, however, that I wouldn’t in fact choose this better life.  Is this 
irrational? 
 
Theories of self-interest have, on their own, no direct implications 
about rationality or reasons for action.  But a theory of self-interest such as 
a Same-World version of the Desire-Fulfillment Theory, together with 
certain auxiliary principles of rationality, will imply that it would be 
irrational for me to decline the Brand-New Life.  One such auxiliary 
principle is the central claim of what Parfit calls the Self-Interest Theory of 
rationality, one of the centerpieces of Reasons and Persons: 
 
 (S1) For each person, there is one supremely rational ultimate aim: 
that his life go, for him, as well as possible.  (4) 
 
Parfit, however, spends Part II and some of Part III of Reasons and Persons 
explaining why he thinks that the Self-Interest Theory of rationality is 
false.19  This is welcome news to those of us who are prepared to say that 
the Brand-New Life is a better life.  That’s because, despite this, it does not 
seem that a refusal to choose the Brand-New Life is irrational.  Just what 
might make this refusal rational is a question that will have to be left for 
another time. 
 
5. Summative vs. Global Desire-Fulfillment Theories 
 
The third section of Appendix I (496-499) concerns again an intramural 
dispute among desire-based theories of self-interest.  Parfit argues that 
such theories should take a “Global” rather than a “Summative” form.  
Summative versions of the Success Theory count all of one’s desires about 
one’s own life; similarly, Summative versions of Preference-Hedonism 
count all of one’s desires about one’s present experiences.  Each theory 
assigns, in proportion to the desire’s strength, a positive value to the 
fulfillment of its favored kind of desire and a negative value to its 
frustration.  Then, to determine how well a life goes overall, the theory 
simply sums the values of the fulfillments and frustrations that occur in 
the life (496).  An Unrestricted Desire-Fulfillment Theory can also take this 
Summative form.  On any Summative view, the intrinsic welfare value of 
                                               
19 See the essays by Hedden and Sauchelli in this volume. 
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a person’s life is derived from the values of all of the fulfillments and 
frustrations contained within it.20 
 
 A Global Desire-Fulfillment Theory, by contrast, 
 
appeals only to global rather than local desires and preferences. A 
preference is global if it is about some part of one's life considered as a 
whole, or is about one’s whole life.  (497) 
 
 Before we consider Parfit’s arguments in favor of Global theories, we 
should be sure that we understand those theories.  Unfortunately, Parfit’s 
definition of ‘global desire’ is not very helpful.  The first disjunct, on 
which a desire is global “if it is about some part of one’s life considered as 
a whole,” is especially obscure.  Is Parfit saying that it is about some part 
of one’s life-considered-as-a-whole (whatever that might mean), or is he 
saying that the part needs to be considered as a whole?  The latter may 
seem the more natural interpretation, but, as we’ll see below, it may 
conflict with some of the work to which Parfit wants to put the concept. 
 
 Nor is the second disjunct, on which a desire is global “if it is about 
one’s whole life,” unproblematic.  The first paragraph in the front matter 
to Reasons and Persons begins, “SIXTEEN years ago, I travelled to Madrid 
with Gareth Evans. I hoped to become a philosopher.”  Is this hope a 
global desire?  Few desires seem “bigger” than the desire to have a certain 
career, but not even this desire fits Parfit’s second disjunct.  The desire to 
become a philosopher isn’t a desire about one’s whole life. 
 
 But we can see by means of his examples the work Parfit wants the 
concept to do, and this may assist us in discerning its contours.   
 
a. The Drug Addiction Case 
 
One such example is the drug addiction case, put forth as a 
counterexample to Summative Theories. 
 
Knowing that you accept a Summative theory, I tell you that I am about 
to make your life go better. I shall inject you with an addictive drug. 
From now on, you will wake each morning with an extremely strong 
desire to have another injection of this drug. Having this desire will be in 
itself neither pleasant nor painful, but if the desire is not fulfilled within 
an hour it will then become very painful. This is no cause for concern, 
since I shall give you ample supplies of this drug. Every morning, you 
will be able at once to fulfil this desire. The injection, and its after-effects, 
                                               
20 Summative Desire-Fulfillment Theories are defended in Heathwood 2005 and 
Heathwood 2006. 
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would also be neither pleasant nor painful. You will spend the rest of 
your days as you do now.  (497) 
 
Even if we had no concerns about side-effects or about the logistics of 
administering to the addiction, probably most of us would decline Parfit’s 
offer.  And if he injected us anyway, perhaps most of us would wish we 
didn’t have this addiction, benign as it is.  But advocates of Summative 
Desire-Fulfillment Theories cannot take refuge in these facts about our 
desires, because, Parfit notes, the negative value of these desire 
frustrations would be swamped by the positive values of the repeated 
daily desire fulfillments (497).  Summative desire theories thus appear to 
imply that it would be in one’s self-interest to accept Parfit’s offer, and 
that, despite one’s wish not to be addicted, it would be in one’s self-
interest to remain an addict. 
 
 But “Global Theories,” Parfit claims, “give us the right answer in the 
case where I make you an addict,” and thus save the Desire-Fulfillment 
approach.  Global Theories 
 
appeal only to someone’s desires about some part of his life, considered 
as a whole, or about his whole life. . . . You would prefer not to become 
addicted, and you would later prefer to cease to be addicted. These are 
the only preferences to which the Global Theories appeal. They ignore 
your particular desires each morning for a fresh injection, since you have 
already considered these desires in forming your global preference.  
 
This application of the concept of global desire shows that Parfit means 
that the relevant part of one’s life is what should be considered as a whole.  
Parfit must here have in mind something like this.  Your being addicted to 
this drug is a part of your life, and it is one that you can consider either 
piecemeal – as you might if you were to think of yesterday’s desire for the 
drug, then today’s, then tomorrow’s, and so on – or as a whole – as you do 
when you consider the more general fact that you are addicted to this 
drug, and realize that you don’t want to be addicted to it.  Fair enough, 
but each morning, when you are desiring a fresh injection, would you not 
be considering that injection as a whole?  Normally, you would be; you 
wouldn’t be considering its elements piecemeal.  Your injecting the drug 
on some morning would thus be a part of your life that you would be (and 
in any case certainly could be) considering as a whole.  A Global Theory 
would consequently include such desires, and Parfit’s solution would be 
undermined. 
 
 In the last sentence of the passage quoted above, Parfit suggests what 
seems to be a new and different definition of ‘global desire’: something 
along the lines of a desire that is not the object of a conflicting higher order 
desire.  Depending on how this definition is clarified, it may be subject to 
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an objection that Parfit himself raises, an objection to the view that a desire 
can be ignored if it is a desire you prefer not to have (497-8).  Rather than 
delve further into just how to understand ‘global desire’, let’s allow Parfit 
to apply the concept as he wishes, in the ways that suit his needs.  Even 
giving him that, his arguments in this section face interesting challenges.21 
 
 One problem is that the drug-addiction thought experiment itself may 
not bear scrutiny.  It is, if you think about it, hard to imagine the case as 
described, and the case may in fact be metaphysically impossible.  In 
particular, it is hard to imagine that a person might (i) have a very strong 
desire for a certain thing, (ii) be aware that the thing is occurring once it 
starts occurring, (iii) continue to want it to be occurring as it is occurring, 
yet (iv) experience no pleasure when it is occurring.  But Parfit’s case 
requires that this be possible.  For each morning you (i) will have a very 
strong desire to be injected, (ii) will be aware that the injection is occurring 
once it is occurring, (iii) will continue to want it to be occurring as it is 
occurring, yet (iv) supposedly experience no pleasure during any of this.  
The idea that this is possible is in fact in tension with the desire-based 
theory of pleasure that Parfit endorses throughout the Appendix.  
According to this theory, “whatever someone wants or does not want to 
experience – however bizarre we find his desires – should be counted as 
being for this person truly pleasant or painful” (501).22  If so, then the 
experience of injecting the drug cannot fail to be pleasant, contrary to 
what Parfit’s thought experiment stipulates. 
 
 This matters because if taking the drug is pleasurable, and being 
“addicted” to it is as benign as Parfit stipulates, it is, upon reflection, not 
very intuitive to think that it is bad to be in this way addicted.  In fact, 
describing it as a case of addiction is simply inaccurate (hence the scare 
quotes above).  “The defining features of addiction are significant distress 
or harm,” according to a standard psychology textbook (Kalat 2016: 362).  
The same book also notes that a person qualifies as being addicted to 
something only if it “cause[s] serious trouble in [their] life” (Kalat 2016: 
497).  It is therefore simply false that the subject in Parfit’s example suffers 
from addiction.  Moreover, it is likely that attaching the label of ‘addiction’ 
to the case distorts our judgment about it, by causing us to assume that 
there must be something bad going on. 
 
                                               
21 Yet another problem with, or at least another thing worth noting about, the appeal to 
global desires is that it is not clear how a Preference Hedonist would make use of the 
notion.   
22 My own view is that this connection between pleasure and desire is true on only one 
sense of ‘desire’ (Heathwood forthcoming). 
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 In fact, it is hard to see what bad is going on.  If you would get 
pleasure from each injection, it seems impossible to distinguish what 
Parfit does to you in making you “addicted” to this drug than what a 
friend does to you in turning you on to, say, a new, in-no-way-unhealthy 
food that you love and come to crave each day – and are able to get each 
day (e.g., morning coffee, an apple a day).  Being “addicted” to such 
things is bad only if you run out of supplies, which is already ruled out in 
Parfit’s example (cf. Heathwood forthcoming: §3b). 
 
 There is admittedly the following difference between Parfit’s case and 
the case of craving and getting coffee each morning or an apple each 
afternoon: in Parfit’s case, you want not to be addicted.  Fair enough, but 
it is not clear why such a desire frustration (one of an intuitively irrational 
desire, given the above analysis of Parfit’s thought experiment) should 
trump the stronger daily desire fulfillments.  It seems similar to a case in 
which a person, due perhaps to a severe religious upbringing, has a 
preference against certain innocent pleasures that they regularly receive.  
Of course the best option would be to rid oneself of the religiously 
induced aversion.  But if that is not possible, the next best option is to 
enjoy the innocent pleasure and put up with the – by hypothesis weaker – 
global desire frustration. 
 
 Upon analysis, then, Parfit’s drug-addiction counterexample, rich and 
worthy of study as it is, does not seem to be successful. 
 
b. The Single-Life Repugnant Conclusion 
 
 Parfit’s other main thought experiment in this subsection is also 
terrifically interesting.  This is “the analogue, within one life, of the 
Repugnant Conclusion” (498).  You could live one of two lives.  In one – call 
it ‘(a)’ – you get “fifty years of life of an extremely high quality”; you 
“would be very happy, would achieve great things, do much good, and 
love and be loved by many people.”  In the other – call it (z) – you would 
receive “an indefinite number of years that are barely worth living” (498).  
In later work, Parfit refers to a similar pair of lives as the “Century of 
Ecstasy” and the “Drab Eternity” (Parfit 1986: 160).  Assuming a Desire-
Fulfillment framework, this amounts to a choice between (a) a fifty-year 
life containing very many fulfillments of strong and important desires and 
few desire frustrations, and (z) an indefinitely long life containing 
occasional, very mild desire fulfillments and few desire frustrations.  As 
Parfit puts it, (z) “would each day contain a few small pleasures” (498).   
 
 Parfit does “not believe that the second alternative would give [him] a 
better life” (498).  But Summative Desire-Fulfillment Theories may seem to 
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imply otherwise.  For however much benefit (a) contains, the amount 
contained in (z) can eventually surpass it, since each additional day adds 
value to it.  Global Theories, by contrast, appear to get just the result Parfit 
wants, for Parfit has a global preference for (a) over (z). 
 
 In fact, however, it is not clear that Summative Theories imply that life 
(z) is better.  For it depends on what Parfit’s global desires are in (z).  
Summative Theories, recall, “appeal to all of someone’s desires” (496, 
emphasis mine).23  They thus count global as well as local desires.  Almost 
as an afterthought to this subsection, Parfit, to bolster the judgment that 
(a) is a better life than (z), adds the detail that, “It is likely that, in both 
alternatives, I would globally prefer the first” (499). 
 
 This detail may help elicit the intuition that (a) is better, but it 
undercuts the other main premise in Parfit’s argument: that Summative 
Theories imply that (z) is better.  This is because, in addition to the fact 
that (z) would each day contain a few minor desire fulfillments, it now 
has, with this detail added, a continuous stream of global desire 
frustration.  In (z), Parfit is continually wishing that he were leading life 
(a).  Parfit never specifies the relative strengths and durations of the daily 
fulfillments and frustrations in (z) so described, but, given the ever-
present global desire in (z) for life (a) and the modest size of (z)’s desire 
fulfillments, it seems likely that the disvalue of its frustrations would 
exceed the value of its fulfillments, thus making (z) negative in value 
overall.  This would make it worse than (a) according to Summative 
Theories and would thus undermine Parfit’s argument against them. 
 
 To give Parfit’s argument a better chance of working, we can suppose 
that, in (z), Parfit does not have a global desire to be living (a) instead.  
Let’s suppose that, in (z), he has no global desires at all; he lives in the 
moment, taking things one day at a time.  This will deliver Parfit’s 
intended result that Summative Theories imply that (z) is better than (a). 
 
 Is this a problem for Summative Theories?  At first blush it may appear 
so, but upon scrutiny, arguably not.  For there is a powerful and by now 
familiar sort of argument for the initially dubious conclusion that the 
drab, indefinitely long life (z) is better than the half-century of ecstasy (a).  
The argument begins by asking us to compare (a) to a certain other life, 
(b).  (b) is twice as long as (a) and only slightly less good at each moment; 
let’s say that it’s about 95% as good at each moment.  Or if that sounds too 
artificial, we can say instead that each day, or week, or year of (b) is about 
                                               
23 That is, all of someone’s desires after any upstream filters – such as to restrictions to 
desires about one’s life on the Success Theory or restrictions to desires about one’s 
experiences on Preference Hedonism – have been applied. 
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95% as good as each day, week, or year of (a).  Putting aside for the 
moment issues of global desires, which life is, intuitively, the better life to 
get?  Obviously, life (b).  Each year of (b) is almost as good as each year of 
(a), but there are twice as many of them in (b). 
 
 Next consider life (c), which stands to (b) as (b) stands to (a).  (c) is a 
200-year life, twice as long as life (b), and each year of (c) is almost as good 
as each year of (b).  Which seems better to you and which would you 
rather have: a 100-year-long life in which you “would be very happy, 
would achieve great things, do much good, and love and be loved by 
many people,” (498) – all while wanting exactly these things – or a very 
similar life of almost as high a quality each year but in which you get to 
live twice as long?  Again, the latter life, life (c), is clearly preferable. 
 
 Of course we can repeat this reasoning, and when we do, we will find 
that life (d) – twice as long as (c) and only slightly lower in quality – is 
better than life (c); we will find that life (e) is better than life (d); and so on, 
until we reach the claim that life (z) is better than its predecessor, life (y), a 
life half as long as (z) but only slightly higher in average annual quality.  
Finally, because the relation of being better than is a transitive relation, it 
follows that life (z), contrary to initial appearances, is better than life (a).24  
The implication of Summative Theories about lives (a) and (z) can thus be 
shown via an independent argument to be the correct verdict after all. 
 
 Can Parfit appeal to global desires to block this line of reasoning?  It 
seems not.  In addition to each life in the sequence (after life (a)) being 
intuitively better than its predecessor, each is also (and surely not 
unrelatedly) a more appealing life to get.  For these reasons, it would be 
very odd for someone to have a global preference for one of these lives 
over its successor in the series.  So I assume that Parfit would in fact 
globally prefer (b) to (a), (c) to (b), and so on, eventually globally 
preferring (z) to (y).  Once Parfit learns this about himself, then, since he is 
presumably not prone to blatant irrationality, he will reverse his initial 
global preference, and come to prefer (z) to (a).  In this case, even his 
preferred Global Theory will imply that (z) would be a better life for him 
to get than would (a). 
 
 Suppose, however, that despite preferring (b) to (a), (c) to (b), (d) to (c), 
… , and (z) to (y), Parfit digs in his heels and continues to prefer (a) to (z).  
Well, either his Global Theory will allow irrational sets of preferences such 
as this one to determine one’s well-being, or it will not.  If it allows it, 
then, since better than is transitive (even if Parfit’s global preferences 
                                               
24 Although it seems undeniable that better than is transitive, this has been denied.  E.g., 
by Temkin (1987) and Rachels (1998). 
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aren’t), his feared result that (z) is better than (a) will remain.  And all this 
view will have done is added the additional, contradictory result that (a) 
is also better than (z).  This hardly seems like an improvement over the 
Summative Theory.  If Parfit’s Global theory doesn’t allow intransitive 
preferences, and so requires preferences to be laundered, this will 
presumably wash away Parfit’s recalcitrant preference for (a) over (z), and 
we will be back where we were a paragraph ago.  It seems hard to avoid 
the (to some) repugnant conclusion that life (z) is better than life (a), and 
in any case the appeal to global desires does not appear to help in 
avoiding it. 
 
 If life (z) is, contrary perhaps to initial appearances, better than life (a), 
this raises the question of why things should have appeared to some as if 
life (a) is better.  Though Parfit doesn’t cite him, the single-life analogue of 
the repugnant conclusion was discussed generations before Reasons and 
Persons by J.M.E. McTaggart.  Astonishingly, McTaggart even writes that 
“this conclusion” – one similar to the conclusion that (z) is better than (a) –
“would . . . be repugnant to certain moralists” (McTaggart 1927: 453).  
McTaggart, for his part, accepted the conclusion that Parfit finds 
repugnant, and offered explanations for why this conclusion might appear 
false.  “It must be remembered that men’s choice in such cases is 
very much affected by their imagination,” he said, adding that it is not 
easy to properly imagine enormously long durations of time.  McTaggart 
also cited a bias that Parfit discusses extensively in Part II of Reasons and 
Persons – the bias towards the near – in explaining why people might 
prefer the shorter, worse life: “we are generally affected more than is 
reasonable by the present or the near future in comparison with the far 
future” (McTaggart 1927: 453).25  It is curious that Parfit didn’t think to 
consider whether his preference for (a) over (z) might be the result of a 
bias that he discusses extensively elsewhere in the book. 
 
 Parfit spends much more time on the Repugnant Conclusion proper 
than on its single-life analogue.  (The Repugnant Conclusion proper is the 
claim that “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all 
with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger 
imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would 
be better, even though its members have lives that are barely worth 
living” (388).)  Parfit would reject the sort of “continuum argument” 
presented above if applied to whole populations in an attempt to establish 
the Repugnant Conclusion proper.  Interestingly, however, at least some 
                                               
25 We also might cite the idea that “we have no reason to trust anyone’s intuitions about 
very large numbers” (Broome 2004: 57-9; see also Huemer 2008: 908-9) and the fact that 
we commonly make intuitive mistakes in the compounding of small quantities (Huemer 
2008: 909-10; cf. the “mistakes in moral mathematics” Parfit discusses in §§27-8).    
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of Parfit’s reasons for rejecting a continuum argument in that context 
don’t carry over to the present context.  In the context of the Repugnant 
Conclusion proper, Parfit would reject (or at least regard as dialectically 
illegitimate) the initial step, the one that claims that a world with a 
“population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of 
life” is not as good as a world with twice as many people, all with a 
quality of life almost as good as in the first world.  Parfit would reject this 
step in order to accommodate the view that it doesn’t make things better 
when we make happy people (as we would if we move from the first to 
the second world above) but only when we make existing people happy.26  
But these reasons don’t apply to the single-life case.  There is at least some 
plausibility to the thought that “of the two ways of increasing the sum of 
happiness – making people happy, and making happy people – only the 
first” (394) is an improvement.  But there is no plausibility to the thought 
that, of the two ways of increasing the sum of happiness in a single life – 
making some fixed number of years better, and adding on additional good 
years – only the first is an improvement.  Parfit’s main views about how 
one might block certain arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion proper 
thus don’t make problems for the above argument for the single-life 
repugnant conclusion. 
 
6. Objective vs. Subjective vs. Hybrid Theories 
 
After considering these various controversies within Desire-Fulfillment 
Theory, Parfit turns to the more fundamental question of whether we 
should accept a subjective theory of self-interest in the first place.  The 
main alternative is to accept the Objective List Theory, which holds that 
getting a good life is less a matter of how we regard or feel about the 
things we get in life (that is what subjectivists think is important) and 
more a matter of the nature of those things themselves.  The good things 
in life on an Objective List Theory “might include moral goodness, 
rational activity, the development of one’s abilities, having children and 
being a good parent, knowledge, and the awareness of true beauty” (499). 
 
 About many philosophical topics, the main theories agree about most 
or all ordinary cases.  This is true for our topic as well.  Items that would 
appear on many Objective Lists tend to be just the sorts of things that 
people want in their lives and would enjoy getting.  Thus, for most actual 
people, objective and subjective theories will agree on how well their lives 
are going (though of course they will give different explanations for why 
they are going as well or as badly as they are going).  For this reason, to 
decide among theories, we often need to test them using cases that aren’t 
found in the actual world.  Thus Parfit says, “In choosing between these 
                                               
26 See the chapter in this volume by Melinda Roberts for more and related details. 
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theories, we must decide how much weight to give to imagined cases in 
which someone’s fully informed preferences would be bizarre” (499).  
Parfit seems generally inclined to rely on such cases in deciding among 
theories (500).  And that’s probably a good thing: if we didn’t so rely, it’s 
not clear how else we would decide. 
 
 Classic objections to subjectivist theories are based on cases featuring 
certain sorts of intuitively defective desires.  One such case involves an 
imagined life full of satisfied pointless desires, as illustrated by Rawls’s 
grass counter (499-500; and see Rawls 1971: 432).  Another such case 
involves an imagined life full of satisfied immoral desires (500).  Many fair-
minded people – perhaps including Parfit, though he never quite says so 
(500) – find it hard to accept that such lives are best for the people with 
these desires. 
 
 But, as a passage in the fifth and final section of the Appendix shows, 
there are arguments on the other side as well.  Consider an Objective List 
Theory that “claims that what is good for someone is to have knowledge, 
to engage in rational activity, and to be aware of true beauty” (501).  
“Would these states of mind be good, if they brought no enjoyment, and if 
the person in these states of mind had not the slightest desire that they 
continue?” (501).  Many fair-minded people – perhaps again including 
Parfit – find this hard to accept too.  It is hard to accept that a life that 
leaves one completely cold can nonetheless be of great benefit to one.  This 
argument is essentially appealing to an internalist doctrine about self-
interest according to which, as Peter Railton put it in 1986, “what is 
intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he 
would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were 
rational and aware” (Railton 1986: 9). 
 
 We thus seem to have arguments against both main approaches – 
subjectivism and objectivism – that fair-minded people find compelling.  
This causes Parfit to wonder if both approaches might be wrong, because 
“each side . . . saw only half the truth” (502).  Perhaps the best theory of 
what makes someone’s life go best will combine objectivist and 
subjectivist elements.  Perhaps 
 
what is best for people is a composite. It is not just their being in the 
conscious states that they want to be in. Nor is it just their having 
knowledge, engaging in rational activity, being aware of true beauty, 
and the like.  . . . What is of value, or is good for someone, is to have 
both; to be engaged in these activities, and to be strongly wanting to be 
so engaged.  (502) 
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This idea, which is now referred to as the Hybrid Theory of well-being, 
has been developed in recent years in different ways by a number of 
different philosophers.27  Although it is not obvious that, as Parfit hopes, 
Hybrid Theories do sufficient justice to internalist intuitions about well-
being,28 it is a promising category of theory that deserves the increased 
attention that it has been getting. 
 
* * * * * 
 
Parfit never returned to explore in as much depth the question of what 
makes someone’s life go best.  The notion of well-being does feature 
prominently in some of his later work, most notably On What Matters, 
where he discusses at length the roles that well-being should play in 
morality and our reasons for action more generally.  Although it is 
possible that which theory of well-being one endorses will affect the 
normative reasons that one thinks one’s well-being provides for oneself 
and others, the question of what role well-being plays in these matters can 
be carried out to a large extent in abstraction from the question of which 
theory of well-being is true.  Parfit’s rich and fertile Appendix illustrates, 
however, that the question of what makes someone’s life go best is worth 
exploring very much for its own sake.29 
 
 
  
                                               
27 E.g., Robert Adams (1999: 93–101), Fred Feldman (2004: 119–22), Shelly Kagan (2009), 
and William Lauinger (2012).  For more on Hybrid Theories (and a concept of them more 
capacious than the category of theory Parfit is delimiting here), see Woodard 2015. 
28 For an argument that they don’t, see Heathwood 2010 (652-3). 
29 Thanks to Ben Eggleston, Brian Hedden, Eden Lin, Susanne Mantel, Andrea Sauchelli, 
and audiences at Saarland University and at the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center 
for Values and Social Policy. 
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